Your basket is currently empty!
Category: Politics and Culture
-
From Tragedy to Spectacle: Kirk, Zarutska, and the Digital Afterlife of Violence.
Craig Kelly
Max Hart
When Iryna Zarutska, a 23-year-old Ukrainian refugee, was fatally stabbed on a North Carolina train, CCTV images of her last moments were not only shared but reframed to become the backdrop to further cultural and political debate (Wolfe, 2025). Similarly, when Charlie Kirk was shot in Utah during his latest of a series of campus events, footage circulated online within hours (Scruton et al. 2025). Clips of the chaos became partisan talking points, recycled endlessly in memes, Tik Toks, miscaptioned videos and other viral content formats. It was not long before they were gamified, sparking public outrage when platform moderators discovered users had built parody scenarios inside Roblox – a popular gaming platform with predominantly younger audiences (Feiner, 2025).
Both events offer another daily reminder that violence in the twenty-first century does not remain confined to the terrestrial space in which it was inflicted. Instead, it is rapidly captured, clipped, circulated in online spaces, and consumed. These spectacles tell us less about the crimes themselves than they do about the cultural and economic system in which they are digested. To make sense of this transformation, we draw from Kelly et al.’s (2023) graze culture, the Deviant Leisure perspective (Raymen and Smith, 2019), and Hall and Winlow’s (2025) analyses of pseudo-pacification, special liberty, and lack. Ultimately, they show that today’s violent spectacles are not aberrations of digital media but symptoms of a much longer historical relationship between violence, entertainment, and consumption harnessed by capitalist desire.
A Long History of Consuming ViolencePublic fascination with violence is not new. From gladiatorial combat in Rome to public hangings in London, societies have long witnessed collective rituals of suffering (Kelly et al. 2023). As Hall (2012) argues, violence was monopolised, pseudo-pacified, and though such public brutality may have declined, the underlying appetites were never extinguished. What disappeared from physical reality has historically emerged in the marketplace, in mediated forms such as penny dreadfuls, crime reports, horror movies, news reports, music, and later, social media and video games. Violence was sanitised, repackaged, but always a present commodity (Kelly et al. 2023).
This duality sits at the core of late consumer culture. As societies officially condemn violence, we simultaneously aestheticize and commodify it. In this sense, the spectacle of Kirk’s assassination or Zarutska’s egregious murder should not be viewed as a rupture within a pacified society, but rather a logical continuation. Where once stood a scaffold for the public to experience suffering and death, now prevails a device cradled in our palms feeding us brutal violent content at the swipe of a screen. Often with algorithms pushing this content whether individuals have searched for content of that nature or not. Indeed, the cultural function, the circulation of violent images as both fear and fascination, remains intact and increasingly automated.
Grazing Death
Kelly et al.’s (2023) concept of graze culture captures how late technological capitalism reshapes this consumption. Instead of sustained critical engagement, audiences “graze” across short, affectively intense fragments. The murder clip, such as that of Kirk and Zarutska, is ideal grazing material – an eight-second shock that is replayable, memeable, and stripped of the messy context that might otherwise awaken us to the harmful structural realities of late consumer capitalism. Importantly, Graze culture is not simply passive scrolling, it is structured by algorithms that reward shareable intensity. Hence the CCTV stills and phone footage that dominate our understandings of these events. They are not just evidence; they are commodities whose value lies in their repeatability and capacity to hold attention in a crowded digital landscape. The tragedy is extracted into consumable fragments that can circulate independent of, and often in disregard to, the victims’ lives, or of justice itself.
Leisure, Play, and the Commodification of Trauma
The deviant leisure perspective (see Raymen and Smith, 2019) helps us further understand, and see the outcomes of, what happens when violence is not just viewed but turned into entertainment. The Roblox murder experiences based on Kirk’s death for example illustrate how late-capitalist leisure cultures merge trauma into the circuits of play. This is not a subcultural transgression, it is a predictable outcome of a cultural and political economy in which every shocking event, especially those demonstrating extreme forms of subjective violence, becomes content to be remixed, mocked, or monetised.
Whilst this violence may be consumed reluctantly by unknowingly netizens as they scroll through their timelines, it is also specifically sought out and enjoyed by many others. The killings are re-enacted in ludic spaces believed to be void of real formal sanction or judgement (Atkinson and Rodgers, 2016) – shared on TikTok with ironic captions or turned into memes to become vital in-group marking points. This is not only deviant because it is (for the most part) socially tolerated, market-driven, and platform enabled. It is also because it further distracts us from deeper rooted social violence that we remain oblivious to (Kelly et al. 2023). Ultimately, leisure under late capitalism thrives on commodifying harm (Raymen and Smith, 2019).
Pseudo-Pacification, Special Liberty, and Lack
As stated, any violent drives have been repressed and channelled whereby such appetites are fulfilled by brutality in its commodified form. Watching Zarutska’s CCTV clip or Kirk’s phone footage becomes a more socially acceptable proxy for transgressive desire. To further this understanding, we can explore the concept of special liberty (Hall and Winlow, 2025). This describes the way neoliberal subjects experience their freedom to transgress. Sharing clips and stills of Kirk’s and Zarutska’s deaths, whether that be under the guise of dark humour through memes, as political irony, or just content for contents sake may initially feel like rebellion against taste and morality. In reality it is what platforms encourage – a shallow freedom that masks deeper conformity to capitalist logic. This brings us to the concept of Lack, the psychoanalytic engine that drives this consumption. Subjects in late capitalism experience a void, an endless yearning that can never be satisfied (Hall and Winlow, 2025). Spectacular violence offers an intense but temporary release. Each shocking clip fills this lack for a fleeting moment – only to reactivate desire for the next spectacle. Indeed, whilst we may see these deaths become the result of further political and ideological debate, it should not be surprising when such clips fade into the background to be replaced by the next. It is disposable capitalism (Hart et al. 2025 forthcoming) in an attention economy.
When combined with graze culture, these concepts reveal a cycle. Society pacifies real violence, consumers experience lack, platforms offer pseudo-transgressive spectacles of death, and audiences graze across them in search of fleeting satisfaction. The murders are real, and so is the grief experienced by the victim’s loved ones, but their mediated afterlife is shaped less by this grief than by this structural compulsion.
Celebrity Commentators, Instrumental Influencers, and the Culture Industry
Whenever we see tragedy such as the Kirk and Zarutska’s murders, celebrity commentators and influencer prosumers become natural intermediaries. Indeed, figures with large online followings rapidly convert violent events into cultural, and in some cases, literal currency. In Kirk’s case, for example, partisan influencers rushed to define what the footage meant, framing it as evidence of broader conspiracies or political decline (Abels et al. 2025; Riccardi and Boak, 2025; Goldin, 2025; Ingram, 2025). In Zarutska’s case, commentators seized on her identity as a refugee, instrumentalising her death in debates on immigration and national security (Cunningham and Sandman, 2025; Hagstrom, 2025; Salsameda, 2025; Sandman, 2025). Furthermore, we see public figures such as Elon Musk and Andrew Tate offer donations for memorial paintings of Zarutska (AOL News, 2025). This act, however, risks being less about genuine commemoration and more about accruing cultural currency and stoking discontent through the culture wars. Such performances are a pseudo-commemoration. Less an act of mourning than a superficial display of empathy that reinforces their visibility in the attention economy rather than addressing the structural conditions that produced the violence. Similarly, celebrities take to social media to offer their condolences, support, and call for solidarity. Whilst these may be positive intentions, in the context of late capitalism’s attention economy, even condolence becomes a kind of spectacular currency within a grief economy. Such appearances of care are ultimately converted into visibility, reach, and soft power.
These commentaries exemplify what Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) refer to as the culture industry. This being the process whereby the complex realities of society are reduced into commodified, superficial soundbites. In late capitalism, celebrity voices do not deepen our understanding, they amplify grazing, feeding audiences the quickest, most emotionally charged interpretations. This dynamic is not accidental. Influencers monetize outrage, platforms reward engagement, and audiences, driven by lack, seek out further transgressional release.
Harm and the Market for Death
Such processes are not harmless. Indeed, families are re-traumatised by the endless replay of their loved ones’ final moments. Likewise, are online populations who, without any consent or warning, are suddenly consuming violent content in the form of real tragedy and death. In this space misinformation spreads faster than facts, distorting justice, and public memory, fuelling existing political and cultural tension. Additionally, not all deaths are equally spectacularised. Some murders capture public imagination, amplified by celebrity voices, whilst others remain invisible. Indeed, just moments after Kirk’s murder a school shooting took place in Colorado though received little media or social media attention (Banner, 2025). Such instances reflect the deep inequalities of the hierarchy of late-capitalist media culture. A culture that further pushes structural violence, and the deep-rooted harm it generates, to the background whilst turning individual violent moments into digital spectacles.
Conclusion
The Colorado school shooting coinciding with the assassination of Kirk functioned as one of the catalysts for politically left leaning social media users to mock his death. Pulling upon previous comments he had made in which he had stated firearm related deaths were “unfortunately” worth it to keep the second amendment, memes flooded the internet inferring the proverbial chickens had come home to roost. In reaction to this, a portion of the right quickly began to store screenshots and forwarded them to the employers and educational institutions of those who had posted. As this blog was being written, a searchable index of 30,000 social media posts was being compiled and is due to be released, offering a searchable index of the doxed posters.
Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom hundreds of thousands of protestors took to the streets on London, rallying around Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka. Tommy Robinson) to take part in the Unite the Kingdom, anti-immigration protests. In the online space, the murder of Zarutska was quickly conflated with the ongoing discontent around immigration in the UK, spurned on with the appearance on Musk being broadcast to those marching and demanding the dissolution of parliament (Ahmed, 2025).
Here we see starkly the conflation of separate social and political landscapes brought forth by globalisation and online spaces. So too, we see a clear demonstration of a dearth of realpolitik in contemporary life (Winlow et al., 2017; Telford, 2022; Winlow and Hall, 2022; Winlow, 2025). On one side, the right who have decried cancel culture over the last decade stymie free speech (admittedly in poor taste) and justify it as consequence culture. Meanwhile the left continues to fail to recognise that the grievances that have led to the death of Kirk and the upsurge in the sale of flags in the United Kingdom stem from decades of some portions of the population being ignored and dismissed as racist and xenophobic.
The tragic murders of Zarutska and Kirk demonstrate both the deep political turmoil faced by western democracies and spurned on by unregulated online spaces. So too, they demonstrate clearly how consumer culture plays a significant role in the pseudo pacification of contemporary life. Spectacular forms of violence, such as these two tragic losses of life, served to offer not only pseudo-transgressive spectacles for those who are politically alienated to graze upon, but offered those who hold power the opportunity to further entrench and normalise ideological and moral stances into political life and move ever further from a realpolitik. Rather than being viewed as a rupture of a pacified society, these appalling acts of violence, commodified and consumed, served as the logical continuation of late capitalism.
References
Abels, G., Briceno, M. and Tuquero, L. (2025) Fact-checking claims about sniper’s identity in Charlie Kirk shooting. Al Jazeera, 12 September. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/12/fact-checking-claims-about-snipers-identity-in-charlie-kirk-shooting (Accessed: 14 September 2025).
Ahmed, A. (2025) Elon Musk calls for dissolution of parliament at far-right rally in London. The Guardian. 13 September. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/sep/13/elon-musk-calls-for-dissolution-of-parliament-at-far-right-rally-in-london (Accessed: 14 September 2025).
Banner, A. (2025) 5 things to know for Sept 11: Charlie Kirk, 9/11, Colorado school shooting, Georgia ICE raid, gas truck explosion. CNN, 11 September. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/11/us/5-things-to-know-for-sept-11-charlie-kirk-9-11-colorado-school-shooting-georgia-ice-raid-gas-truck-explosion (Accessed: 14 September 2025).
Adorno, T. W. and Horkheimer, M. (1997) The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception. In: G. S. Nörr, ed. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Verso, pp. 120-167.
AOL News, 2025. Elon Musk and Andrew Tate pour millions into Iryna Zarutska murals across U.S. Available at: https://www.aol.com/news/elon-musk-andrew-tate-pour-165211008.html (Accessed: 14 September 2025).
Cunningham, T. and Sandman, G. (2025) North Carolina Republicans blame Democrats for ‘woke’ policies they say contributed to Charlotte light-rail stabbing. ABC News. Available at: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/north-carolina-republicans-blame-democrats-woke-policies-contributed/story?id=125480126 ([Accessed 14 September 2025).
Feiner, L. (2025) Roblox says it will remove posts re-enacting Charlie Kirk’s killing. The Verge, 12 September. Available at: https://www.theverge.com/policy/777628/roblox-says-it-will-remove-posts-re-enacting-charlie-kirks-killing (Accessed: 14th September 2025).
Goldin, M. (2025) ‘Fact Focus: Assassination of Charlie Kirk prompts flood of false and misleading claims online’. NBC10 Philadelphia, 12 September. Available at: https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/politics/fact-focus-assassination-of-charlie-kirk-prompts-flood-of-false-and-misleading-claims-online/4268659 (Accessed: 14 September 2025).
Hagstrom, A. (2025) ‘NC Republicans lay into Dems over Charlotte murder, crime policies: ‘She died because of our complacency’’. Fox News, 11 September. Available at: https://www.foxnews.com/politics/nc-republicans-lay-dems-over-charlotte-murder-crime-policies-she-died-because-our-complacency (Accessed: 14 September 2025).
Hall, S. (2012). Theorising Crime and Deviance: A New Perspective. London: Sage.
Hall, S. & Winlow, S. (2025). Revitalizing Criminological Theory: Advances in Ultra-Realism. Abingdon: Routledge.
Hart, M., Bavin, K. and Lynes, A. (2025 – forthcoming) Artificial Intelligence, Capitalism, and the Logic of Harm: Toward a Critical Criminology of AI. Critical Criminology.
Ingram, D. (2025) ‘Toxic rhetoric, including calls for ‘civil war’ and retribution, surges after Charlie Kirk killing’. NBC News, 12 September. Available at: https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/national-international/charlie-kirk-shooting-online-calls-civil-war-retribution-rhetoric/4268391 (Accessed: 14 September 2025).
Kelly, C., Lynes, A. & Hart, M., 2023. ‘Graze Culture’ and serial murder: Brushing up against ‘familiar monsters’ in the wake of 9/11. In: S.E. Fanning & C. O’Callaghan, eds. Serial Killing on Screen: Adaptation, True Crime and Popular Culture. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 295–321. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17812-2 [Accessed 26 August 2025].
Raymen, T. and Smith, O. (eds.) (2019) Deviant Leisure: Criminological Perspectives on Leisure and Harm. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan
Riccardi, N. and Boak, J. (2025) Utah governor says the motive is not yet certain but the suspect was on the left. AP News, 12 September. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/aef9fe8dc82d218a36d078536717d95d (Accessed: 14 September 2025).
Sandman, G. (2025) ‘Media uses ‘Republicans pounce’ spin in Charlotte stabbing of Ukrainian refugee Iryna Zarutska’. Fox News, 12 September. Available at: https://www.foxnews.com/media/liberal-media-fuels-republicans-pounce-narrative-charlotte-stabbing-ukrainian-refugee-sparks-outcry (Accessed: 14 September 2025).
Salsameda, C. (2025) ‘N.C. Republicans blame Democrats, say light rail killing ‘100% preventable’’’. Spectrum Local News, 12 September. Available at: https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nc/charlotte/news/2025/09/11/north-carolina-republicans-charlotte-stabbing (Accessed: 14 September 2025).
Scruton, P., Watson, C., Boulinier, L. and Olorenshaw, A. (2025) How the Charlie Kirk shooting unfolded – in maps, videos and images. The Guardian, 11 September. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/sep/11/charlie-kirk-shooting-maps-videos-images (Accessed: 14th September 2025).
Telford, L. (2022) English Nationalism and its Ghost Towns. London: Routledge
Wolfe, E. (2025) Charlotte train stabbing: Ukrainian victim. CNN, 9 September. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/09/us/charlotte-train-stabbing-ukrainian-victim (Accessed 14th September 2025).
Winlow, S. (2025) The Politics of Nostalgia: Class, Rootlessness and Decline. Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited.
Winlow, S., Hall, S., and Treadwell, J. (2017) The Rise of the Right: English Nationalism and the transformation of working-class politics. Bristol: Policy Press.
Winlow, S., and Hall, S. (2022) The Death of the Left: Why we Must Begin from the Beginning Again. Bristol: Policy Press.
-
The Disunion Jack: National Flags and the Fragile Balance of Orderly Disorder
Emma Armstrong
Steve Hall
One year and one month after the summer riots of 2024, here we are again. The same tensions are bubbling to the surface. Across towns and cities in England, the St George’s flag has been painted on roundabouts, draped from lampposts, and flown proudly from windows and car bonnets. Some councils have begun to remove them, arguing that it’s a matter of health and safety – in our region, a local hospital requested their removal because they posed a risk to air ambulances (O’Leary, 2025) – while others insist they will leave them untouched (ITV, 2025). But for protestors, these removals are not bureaucratic housekeeping, they are a direct attack on free speech and national pride.
The St George’s Cross has long carried contested meanings in England, and today’s disputes are part of that longer story. In the 1990s and 2000s, the flag was heavily associated with far-right groups, but at the same time, for many football fans major sporting events such as the World Cup normalised its display. During the World Cup in 2014, Labour MP Emily Thornberry caused a furore and was forced to resign from the Shadow Cabinet after she had posted an inferential photo of a football fan displaying a St George’s flag in his window with his white van parked underneath it. This dual history means that the St George’s Cross continues to sit uneasily between patriotism and xenophobia, between an apparently benign symbol of national identity and a banner that can evoke fear and exclusion (Brown et al., 2012).
The current disputes, then, are not a new phenomenon but the latest manifestation of a long-running symbolic struggle over who the flag belongs to, and what kind of nation it represents. From an ultra-realist perspective, we argue that these disputes are not really about flags or even about free speech. They represent the deeper insecurities and fractures of the West’s late-capitalist, post-industrial, post-imperial societies. The national flag is a convenient symbol onto which people can project numerous feelings ranging from pride and belonging to exclusion, resentment and xenophobia.
We use the concept of pseudo-pacification to explain how these symbolic battles are the way conflict is staged and managed in Western societies. Over a period of 700 years, the overt physical violence that was once a primary internal social structuring and managerial force has largely been repressed and institutionalised (at least for now). However, underlying resentments and insecurities have in many ways increased in intensity. During flashpoints associated with economic decline, political failure and social unrest they have to go somewhere.
Hall (2012) argues that modern societies have not eliminated or even ‘stored’ physical violence as Elias (1939) suggested, but have essentially re-routed and repurposed it. Through what Hall (2007) calls the pseudo-pacification process, everyday physical violence is suppressed by the state in order to allow markets and commerce to flourish and property to be protected. But the aggressive impulses that once played out in direct confrontation have not simply disappeared and indeed were never discouraged. Instead, they were encouraged, sublimated and bound by evolving norms and laws to fuel the sociosymbolic competition essential to consumer culture’s crucial role in boosting aggregate demand (Hall and Winlow, 2025).
In other words, the arena of physical conflict has been relocated from the battlefield or the street to the cultural sphere, where people fight over meaning, recognition, and legitimacy. This is what we see in the disputes around flags. In a pseudo-pacified society, the West’s national flags have become a gesture representing deeper frustrations, a major signifier in the symbolic site where struggles over identity and belonging can be staged. To remove them is an act many experience as silencing, erasure, or disrespect. For others, flying them is an attempt to reestablish atavistic sentiments of imperial supremacy that should be consigned permanently to a history we should all be glad to leave behind.
But why now? Ultra-realism’s historical research suggests that capitalism cannot survive in conditions of either pure pacification or pure disorder. Energetic markets rely on sublimated competition in the spheres of production and consumption and therefore simply cannot function in cultures of normalised altruism or violence. Too much violent chaos disrupts trade, property, and everyday life. Too much altruism, peace and stability, however, would sap the competitive energy and resentment that consumer capitalism relies on. What we live in, then, is a managed middle ground, what Horsley et al. (2015) call ‘orderly disorder’, where people are simultaneously stimulated and pacified.
In situations where market systems veer rapidly towards plutocracy and fail to deliver social justice and economic opportunities or rewards for increasingly precarious workers, political protests and riots are common responses. Where brutal repression has been imposed in the past, today’s neoliberal authorities do not aim to eliminate unrest but to manage it within tolerable boundaries, a process Horsley et al. (2015) describe as essential to the maintenance of legitimacy. Subjects must be given the opportunity to feel as though their protests are resonating amongst the political class at the same time as their activism is quickly absorbed back into the system to become yet again neutralised, mythologised and, where possible, commodified as a historical memory (Kotzé, 2020). “Yes, we showed ‘em what’s what on that day!”
So, briefly, what are the principal ways in which the subjects we see today spray-painting roundabouts stimulated and pacified? We can see populist rhetoric positioning the white working class as betrayed or left behind (Telford, 2025) in a context where the death of the left and absence of effective political representation (Winlow and Hall, 2022) creates a desolate empty space in which resentment echoes and reverberates to a crescendo. Some white working-class citizens in precarious economic situations (Lloyd 2018) perceive immigrants and minority groups as ‘the others’ able to enjoy sympathy, freedoms and cultural expression supposedly denied to them.
This ‘theft of enjoyment’ (Žižek, 2005), once derived from a sense of cultural belonging spiced by an old imperialist ideology of false superiority, has been lowered by the liberal political elite into a dark abyss of inferiority and displacement (Winlow 2025). From this perspective, the removal of St George’s flags is not a neutral bureaucratic act, but another example of stolen enjoyment experienced in stark contrast to the ‘celebration of the other’, typical of a treacherous political elite populated by figures such as ‘two-tier Kier’ currently haunting the Palace of Westminster and our other mainstream institutions.
To these insecure people it seems quite unequivocal that consumer capitalism’s broken promises of success and the ability and right to display all its symbols have stoked feelings of inadequacy (Ellis et al., 2018). Flags are perfect vehicles for this nostalgia as they condense the memory of a simpler, more secure identity, which, for a brief period after WWII, was celebrated as heroic, functional and deserving of all the rewards under the sun (Winlow, 2025). Those who were imaginary heroes of the British Imperium and workers in the temporary industrial economy of rising wages have experienced the reality of a great fall.
This sense of loss after a rapid fall has jeopardised the efficiency of the pseudo-pacification process. Where subjective violence has been largely suppressed through criminalisation and anger has been assuaged by the consumer pleasures of streaming services, sport, alcohol, fast food and so on, there are times when the sense of loss, humiliation and betrayal intensifies and erupts through these always fragile layers. Here the shameless display of nationalistic symbols acts as a perverse duality, a personally risky yet structurally safe challenge to the distant political elite – a spectacular micro-resistance that allow subjects to feel as though they are resisting and being punished while at the same time showing their loyalty and commitment to the system.
Misrecognition of immigrants as their principal enemy permanently distracts these theatrical white nationalists from effective political engagement with opposition to the neoliberal system that has pulled the rug from under their feet. When the anger subsides and the streets are cleared, nostalgia returns as the great pacifier, redirecting emotional energy backwards to a mythical past rather than a future that would be susceptible to real change should substantive politics return (Winlow and Hall, 2022). Anger is thus trapped in this imagined history, fuelling a yearning for a past that can’t be restored and succeeding only in reproducing sentiments that belong to it, an emotional spectrum that ranges from mutual love and solidarity to overt racism.
However, when the balance of stimulation and pacification is disturbed the pseudo-pacification process breaks down (Winlow et al., 2015) and we see acts permitted by special liberty, the subject’s sense of entitlement to enact harm and violence with impunity (Kotzé, 2024). When the balance tipped in the UK in July 2024, the consequences were volatile, enabled by the rioter’s momentary belief that they had the ethical case and the social permission to act. The physical violence that marked last year’s riots was repressed and remains so for now, but the underlying energy of the unsymbolised Real trapped in the misrecognitions of the Imaginary continues to fuel battles over representation.
The disputes around flags are not isolated eruptions of cultural grievance. They are symptoms of a social order dependent on a managed tension between stimulation and pacification. Symbolic battles such as the fight over the St George’s Cross absorb the frustrations of those who feel excluded, channelling aggression into disputes over cultural meaning and recognition that risk bouts of outright violence and revanchist racism – a risk the dominant neoliberal order is willing to take rather than confront coordinated political action. Councils remove flags, protestors re-erect them, media coverage amplifies the outrage, and the cycle continues. Neoliberalism’s underlying insecurities remain unresolved, but the conflict is contained, managed, and endlessly recycled. It is also quickly and easily commodified. Parsley (2025) reported that ‘sales of Union Flags and St George’s flags have risen by around 20 per cent and flagpole purchases have doubled in recent weeks’. What appears to be an act of cultural defiance is also a profitable consumer trend, with neoliberal capitalism once again the only winner.
References
Brown, L., Richards, S., and Jones, I. (2012) ‘Sojourner perceptions of the St George Cross flag during the FIFA 2010 World Cup: A symbol of carnival or menace?’ International Review for the Sociology of Sport. 49. Pp. 102-20.
Elias, N. (1939) The Civilizing Process. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ellis, A., Winlow, S., Briggs, D. J. S., Esquinas, A. S., Verdugo, R. C., and Suárez, J. R. P. (2018) ‘Liberalism, lack and “living the dream”: Reconsidering the attractions of alcohol-based leisure for young tourists in Magaluf, Majorca.’ Journal of Extreme Anthropology. 2(2). Pp. 1-19.
Hall, S. (2007) ‘The emergence and breakdown of the pseudo-pacification process.’ In Watson, K. (Ed.) Assaulting the Past: Placing Violence in Historical Context. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press.
Hall, S. (2012) Theorizing Crime and Deviance: A New Perspective. London: Sage Publications.
Hall, S. and Winlow, S. (2025) Revitalizing Criminological Theory: Advances in Ultra-Realism. (2nd ed). Abingdon: Routledge.
Horsley, M., Kotzé, J., and Hall, S. (2015) ‘The maintenance of orderly disorder: Modernity, markets, and the pseudo-pacification process.’ Journal of European History of Law. 6. Pp. 18-29.
ITV. (2025) ‘Lincolnshire County Council won’t paint over England flag graffiti.’ [online]. Available at: https://www.itv.com/news/calendar/2025-08-28/council-says-it-wont-paint-over-england-flag-graffiti. (Accessed on: 29/08/2025).
Kotzé, J. (2020) ‘The commodification of abstinence.’ In Hall, S., Kuldova, T., and Horsley, M. (Eds.) Crime, Harm and Consumerism. Milton: Routledge.
Kotzé, J. (2024) ‘On special liberty and the motivation to harm’. The British Journal of Criminology. 65(2). Pp. 314-27.
Lloyd, A. (2018) The Harms of Work: An Ultra-Realist Account of the Service Economy. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
O’Leary, A. (2025) ‘Flag removed near James Cook Hospital over risks to air ambulance.’ The Northern Echo. [online]. Available at: https://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/news/25447662.flag-removed-near-james-cook-hospital-risk-air-ambulance/.
Parsley, D. (2025) ‘Flag wars fuelling Union Jack and St George’s Cross sales.’ The I Paper. [online]. Available at: https://inews.co.uk/news/flag-wars-fuelling-union-jack-st-georges-cross-3885185?srsltid=AfmBOoqfIt69989PWGY61lHe0yjymuA5BZmconDwmzHL5jlm0UG7fkca.
Telford, L. (2025) ‘Left behind places, neoliberalism and systemic violence in the UK.’ Frontiers in Sociology. 10. Pp. 1632190.
Winlow, S. (2025) The Politics of Nostalgia: Class, Rootlessness and Decline. London: Emerald Publishing Limited.
Winlow, S., and Hall, S. (2022) The Death of the Left: Why we Must Begin from the Beginning Again. London: Policy Press.
Žižek, S. (2005) The Metastases of Enjoyment. London: Verso.
-
The Digital Coliseum: How Capitalism Turns Our Pain into Spectacle
What if the freedom we feel when using digital platforms is just a beautifully packaged illusion? We spend hours on TikTok, Instagram, OnlyFans, Tinder, BeReal, Snapchat, or Reddit, convinced that we are choosing, enjoying, and even liberating ourselves. But who really benefits? Spoiler: it’s not us. As ultra-realist criminologists argues, not everything that looks like empowerment truly is (Hall and Winlow, 2015). Digital leisure, once imagined as a liberating space, has become a structural machine of emotional, symbolic and economic exploitation (Raymen and Smith, 2020). And the most insidious part? It happens with our apparent consent. Or so we think.
We live inside an emotional economy where algorithms don’t reward what is valuable but what is viral. Not what is ethical but what is profitable. The logic is simple: the more you expose yourself, the more you’re rewarded. TikTok’s ‘For You’ page doesn’t promote creativity; it promotes emotional intensity. Tears, nudity, self-harm, humiliation, anything goes if it attracts clicks. This mirrors the principles of late-neoliberal capitalism, where an individual’s value is tied to market performance (Streeck, 2016). Psychologically, this virality of disturbing content also taps into our evolutionary and affective sensitivities, what Rozin and Royzman (2001) call negativity bias, where the brain is wired to pay closer attention to potential threats, pain, and spectacle.
In 2024, Ofcom reported that 57% of children aged 7-17 in the UK use TikTok daily, often with minimal parental oversight (Ofcom, 2024). Meanwhile, The Guardian (2022) reported that TikTok’s algorithms internationally and repeatedly pushed the ‘Blackout Challenge’ videos to children, resulting in tragic deaths later linked to the challenge. And it doesn’t stop there. One disturbing manifestation of this emotional economy is the practice of ‘sharenting’, whereby family vloggers monetise their children’s lives. YouTube and TikTok are flooded with ‘day-in-the-life’ content, birthday reveals and emotional breakdowns, produced and consumed like reality TV but starring minors. A stark example is the case of teen ‘kidfluencer’ Piper Rockelle, whose mother and partner now face lawsuits alleging exploitation and abuse, claims unpacked in Netflix’s documentary Bad Influence: The Dark Side of Kidfluencing. What does informed consent mean for a child raised as content? As Strohmaier et al. (2020) warn, this practice and the wider platform economy reward emotional over-exposure with visibility and symbolic capital.
But let’s be clear: this isn’t just about influencers or irresponsible parenting. This is a structural issue. And it’s working exactly as designed. Ultra-realist criminology dismantles the comforting myths of agency in late capitalism. What often feels like freedom is, in fact, a simulated agency, a carefully engineered illusion of choice that operates strictly within the limits of what the system considers profitable, acceptable, and self-defeating (Hall and Winlow, 2015). You are free to choose, but only from the options that will keep the machine running. This becomes especially clear when we look at platforms like OnlyFans. You can decide what to post, when to post, and how to brand yourself. But when your rent is due, your benefits have been slashed, and mainstream employment excludes or devalues you (Lloyd, 2018), how meaningful is that ‘choice’? This isn’t about traditional notions of deviance or criminality. We are not talking about ‘others’; we are talking about ourselves. Ordinary people are trapped in a structure that demands constant self-curation and emotional performance just to stay visible, relevant, or afloat.
Deviant leisure may sound like academic jargon, but its reality is raw and disturbingly familiar. It names those practices that seem transgressive (sexting, filtered selfies, livestreamed self-harm, ironic misogyny and performative outrage) but are, in fact, deeply integrated into the digital economy. They look like rebellion but in reality they are often rehearsals for visibility, monetised through clicks, shares and algorithms. Cultural theory once romanticised these acts as symbolic resistance, subversive gestures against social norms – but in actuality they are a form of hyper-conformity, rather than non-conformity (Kotzé, 2020). But ultra-realist criminology cuts through that illusion. These aren’t ruptures in the system; they are expressions of it, performances for power, not against it. Each one feeds a platform economy that thrives on our suffering, our vulnerability and our compulsion to be seen (Smith and Raymen, 2016). In the digital coliseum, an algorithmically built arena where pain is polished and applause is measured in interaction metrics, the user becomes both audience and gladiator: performing for survival, competing for visibility, and always one swipe away from erasure.
We live in an age where suffering is curated. It’s not just about what we feel, but how we present it. Anguish must be aesthetic. Anxiety must be shareable. Despair must be productive. From viral ‘breakdown’ confessionals to trends romanticising trauma, the performance of harm becomes a pathway to recognition. The issue isn’t that people speak about their pain (expression matters), but expression within a system that demands emotional exposure for engagement is not the same as autonomy. You can suffer – but only if your suffering is algorithmically legible and profitable. And if you don’t perform it, someone else will. Because in the visibility economy, not being seen means not existing. But being seen requires packaging yourself as a spectacle. And what once might have been intimate, collective or therapeutic now becomes just another product in the endless scroll.
As Debord (1967) warned, the spectacle doesn’t reflect reality; it replaces it. In that replacement, even our most personal forms of distress become raw material for platforms that extract affect like a resource, just another currency in the attention economy. There’s nothing rebellious in this. No rupture. No liberation. Just a perfectly designed loop of pseudo-transgression and aestheticised harm, repeated not out of resistance but out of ontological hunger – a desperate search for meaning, status or survival within systems that thrive on our fragility (Kotzé, 2020). But this loop doesn’t exist in isolation, it demands spectators. The digital coliseum relies not just on those who perform, but those who consume. As products of consumer culture, we are conditioned to take interest in the suffering of others, not with empathy, but with fascination. Kelly (2023) shows how 21st century media cultivates an obscene enjoyment, a compulsive pleasure in pain among audiences who repeatedly consume scandal, hate, and humiliation. Viewers are not mere witnesses but active participants deriving ecstatic thrill from exposure to transgression, yet Kelly argues it is the spectators who are truly ‘caught on tape’.
On OnlyFans, many marginalised women monetise their intimacy, which some call sexual empowerment. But how much empowerment exists within a structure that rewards exposure and punishes silence? Illouz (2007) and Han (2014) describe this as affective capitalism: a system where our emotions are valuable only when they can be turned into data. Yet, as Medley (2019) argues, even feminist pornography, which is often celebrated as resistance, succumbs to the same capitalist logic. What appears as empowerment is often an example of ‘hedonic realism’, the inability to imagine leisure or pleasure beyond consumer capitalism. Within this logic, consent is shaped not by autonomy but by economic desperation. Rather than resisting the mainstream, these practices are ‘precorporated’ (Fisher, 2009; Medley, 2019), already formatted to fit capitalist structures before they even begin. Claims to political agency may amount to little more than ‘hypercorporation’, the performance of resistance that deliberately reproduces the very dynamics it claims to challenge. So, are we really free if all we get to choose is how we market ourselves? To make sense of how power, visibility and harm are distributed in the digital ecosystem, I found it useful to represent these dynamics as a conceptual pyramid.
Figure 1. The Structural Logic of Digital Harm (Mayra Barrera: 2025)
This framework doesn’t just map behaviours – it reveals a structural order. Digital leisure isn’t free-floating; it’s stratified and each analytical layer performs a specific role in sustaining the system’s logic. As we move from macro-level structures to micro-level subjectivities, we see how harm becomes routine, not by accident but by design.
- Macro. System Architects. At the widest layer of the inverted triangle sit the system architects, the technological monopolies, platform owners, and algorithmic designers who define the digital environment. Through the political economy and surveillance infrastructures, they engineer desire, structure emotional expression, and embed neoliberal logic. The socio-economic system promotes competition and non-physical aggression, which creates the anxious, pseudo-pacified subjects visible in the other levels (Hall, 2012).
- Meso. Emotional Intermediaries and Institutional Brokers. The middle layer contains the intermediaries who translate macro logics into everyday practices. Influencers, content creators, and parents who monetise emotional labour function here as brokers of affect. Their actions exemplify what Hall, Winlow, and Ancrum (2008) termed special liberty: a narcissistic sense of entitlement to transgress ethical or legal boundaries with impunity. In digital capitalism, their behaviour is not a failure of moderation, but a predictable outcome. Alongside them are digital employers and moderators who enforce platform norms. These actors operationalise harm by converting emotion, intimacy, and identity into marketable content, all while appearing authentic or empowering. They don’t create the rules, but they enforce and benefit from them.
- Micro. Structurally Exposed Individuals. At the tip of the triangle, the narrowest but most densely populated, are the individual users, especially the structurally exposed. Children, racialised communities, neurodivergent users, and those with limited digital literacy face the highest vulnerability with the least power. Yet, their visibility is actively engineered; they are both product and audience. The vast majority of users are ‘passive’. They consume, like, share, and scroll, not always maliciously but often uncritically. Even when they reject certain content, their engagement sustains its visibility. Participation becomes complicity and disengagement threatens symbolic erasure.
Hovering over every level is a force less visible but more powerful than any single actor: the ideological and algorithmic logic of late neoliberal capitalism. This is not just a technological infrastructure, but an ideological architecture. It scripts desire, visibility, and value, encoding neoliberal principles into reward systems, including what to feel, when to share, and how to perform pain. The system doesn’t need to force you, it only needs to train you. And that’s the paradox, we are not outside the pyramid. We’re inside it, producing, consuming, and reproducing the very logic that exploits us.
Governments legislate. But they move slowly, clumsily. France, Germany, the UK and the EU all have attempted content regulation but without dismantling the architecture of harm. Such legislation addresses the symptoms, not the system, targeting the visible effects while leaving the structural logic untouched. Deleting violent videos isn’t enough if the algorithm that promotes them remains untouched. We need an ethical approach that sees harm not just as a legal issue, but as a structural feature of digital capitalism. Because this isn’t just about content, it’s about how lives, emotions and identities are structured for profit. It’s anxiety, burnout, compulsive exposure, and the slow erosion of autonomy sold back to us as empowerment.
Digital leisure, far from offering refuge, becomes a form of pacified compliance. What appears as transgression – sexual display, emotional oversharing and commodified vulnerability – is, in fact, a desperate negotiation with invisibility. These performances don’t subvert the system, they sustain it, one post, one click, one trauma at a time. As Hall and Winlow (2015) argue, capitalism no longer dominates through force when it can seduce us into exploiting ourselves. We internalise market logic so deeply that we brand our pain, aestheticise our despairs, all while believing we’re empowered. The system creates the suffering whilst providing a commodified coping strategy that it also profits from. This is what ultra-realism calls ontological insecurity: a pervasive sense of meaninglessness, of being structurally out of place, that drives us to seek validation in commodified forms (Raymen and Smith, 2020). But in the attention economy, visibility is conditional. Social media becomes the mirror where we hope to ‘matter’ (Billingham and Irwin-Rogers, 2022), even if it means performing harm, overexposure or reducing ourselves to spectacles. Recognition comes at the cost of your intimacy, stability, and self. This cycle is reinforced by what Hall et al. (2008) termed ‘pseudo-pacification’: a form of control that doesn’t rely on punishment and subjective violence, but on pleasure, distraction, symbolic gratification, competition, and structural harm.
Digital leisure is no longer just entertainment; it’s a battlefield — symbolic, emotional, and political, where bodies, attention, and identity are negotiated and commodified. What used to be play is now performance. What once offered freedom now extracts value. And where are we headed? If we do nothing, the future won’t be dystopian, it will be a more optimised version of today. Algorithms won’t protect us, they’ll predict us. Content won’t be more human, it will be more addictive, manipulative and profitable. Surveillance will become ambient. Consent will become decorative. The line between intimacy and exposure will vanish. As Zuboff (2019) argues in The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, surveillance infrastructures are not passive observers, but systems actively shaping behaviour to align with corporate goals. Similarly, Kuldova (2020) shows how algorithmic governance turns human interaction into predictable, governable, and monetisable flows of data. Within this logic, other content creators are not just peers but competitors, obstacles to recognition, visibility, and symbolic survival. In various online communities, users employ the very architecture of the system designed to protect users (e.g. reporting posts) as weapons through which they can attack and undermine the competition, potentially causing harm. Here, symbolic violence can result in a kind of symbolic death for the victim, via the erasure of visibility within the digital economy.
Technology is not the enemy. Technological advancement is necessary, laudable, and even emancipatory when developed with justice, care and democratic intent. The problem isn’t platforms or AI themselves, but how they’re designed, owned and weaponised within systems that turn attention into capital and vulnerability into spectacle. The real issue is structural. Algorithms don’t exploit people. Systems do. Systems that engineer desire, monetise emotion and normalise harm while branding it as freedom. As McGowan (2016) argues, capitalism doesn’t suppress desire, it feeds on it, manipulating our longing by promising fulfilment through consumption while ensuring that fulfilment remains perpetually deferred. These systems tap into the very structure of human subjectivity, turning lack into a profit model. It’s not just a question of values, it’s about how our desires, technologies and lives are being structured. Changing that requires not only ethics, but also politics, collective imagination and structural conflict.
The threat isn’t AI, it’s symbolic capitalism, a system where every difference becomes a product, every connection becomes data and every wound becomes content. This is not a technical crisis. It’s a cultural, emotional and existential one. The question is no longer whether we can resist; the real question is whether we are willing to imagine and build other ways of living, connecting, showing up and caring. Ways that honour dignity, not market visibility. Because if we don’t, we will continue to celebrate our slavery as if it were autonomy. And the coliseum, though digital, will keep devouring bodies. Only now, not with roars or spectacles but with filters, likes and monetisation.
We can’t afford to be spectators anymore. It’s time to leave the coliseum.
References
Billingham, L., and Irwin-Rogers, K. (2022) Against Youth Violence: A Social Harm Perspective. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
Debord, G. (1967) The Society of the Spectacle. Paris: Buchet-Chastel.
Fisher, M. (2009) Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? Winchester: Zero Books.
Guardian. (2022). ‘TikTok served blackout challenge videos to children minutes after joining’. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/nov/02/tiktok-served-blackout-challenge-videos-to-children-minutes-after-joining. (Accessed on: 17th June 2025).
Hall, S. (2012) Theorizing Crime and Deviance: A New Perspective. London: Sage Publications.
Hall, S. and Winlow, S. (2015) Revitalizing Criminological Theory: Towards a New Ultra-Realism. London: Routledge.
Hall, S., Winlow, S. and Ancrum, C. (2008) Criminal Identities and Consumer Culture: Crime, Exclusion and the New Culture of Narcissism. Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
Han, B.-C. (2014) Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power. London: Verso.
Illouz, E. (2007) Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Kelly, C. R. (2023) Caught on Tape: White Masculinity and Obscene Enjoyment. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kotzé, J. (2020) ‘The commodification of abstinence.’ In Hall, S., Kuldova, T., and Horsley, M. (Eds.) Crime, Harm, and Consumerism. London: Routledge.
Kuldova, T. (2020) ‘Algorithmic governance and the opacity of power’. Big Data & Society. 7(2). Pp.1–5.
Lloyd, A. (2018) The Harms of Work: An Ultra-Realist Account of the Service Economy. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
McGowan, T. (2016) Capitalism and Desire: The Psychic Cost of Free Markets. New York: Columbia University Press.
Medley, C. (2019) ‘The business of resistance: Feminist pornography and the limits of leisure industries as sites of political resistance.’ In Raymen, T., and Smith, O. (Eds.) Deviant Leisure: Criminological Perspectives on Leisure and Harm. London: Palgrave.
Ofcom. (2024) ‘Children and parents: Media use and attitudes report 2024’. [online] Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0027/265961/children-and-parents-media-use-and-attitudes-report-2024.pdf. (Accessed on 17th June 2025).
Raymen, T. and Smith, O. (2020) Deviant Leisure: Criminological Perspectives on Leisure and Harm. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rozin, P., and Royzman, E. D. (2001) ‘Negativity bias, negativity dominance, and contagion.’ Personality and Social Psychology Review. 5(4). Pp. 296-320.
Smith, O. and Raymen, T. (2016) ‘Deviant leisure: A criminological perspective’. Theoretical Criminology. 20(2). Pp.196–212.
Streeck, W. G. (2016) How Will Capitalism End? London: Verso.
Strohmaier, H., Murphy, C., DeRiggi, S., and Brunner, R. (2020) ‘Sharenting: Children’s rights and digital media’. Journal of Family Studies. 26(1). Pp.78–92.
Zuboff, S. (2019) The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. London: Profile Books.